Systems and methods for detecting and mitigating programmable logic device tampering

ABSTRACT

Systems and methods are disclosed for preventing tampering of a programmable integrated circuit device. Generally, programmable devices, such as FPGAs, have two stages of operation; a configuration stage and a user mode stage. To prevent tampering and/or reverse engineering of a programmable device, various anti-tampering techniques may be employed during either stage of operation to disable the device and/or erase sensitive information stored on the device once tampering is suspected. One type of tampering involves bombarding the device with a number of false configuration attempts in order to decipher encrypted data. By utilizing a dirty bit and a sticky error counter, the device can keep track of the number of failed configuration attempts that have occurred and initiate anti-tampering operations when tampering is suspected while the device is still in the configuration stage of operation.

FIELD OF INVENTION

This disclosure relates to systems and methods for securing theprogramming data of a programmable device—e.g., a field-programmablegate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device (PLD)—againstcopying and other tampering.

BACKGROUND OF THE DISCLOSURE

Programmable devices are well known. In one class of known PLDs, eachdevice has a large number of logic gates, and a user programs the deviceto assume a particular configuration of those logic gates, frequentlyusing a software tool provided by the manufacturer of the device, withthe software tool being executed on a computer having an adapter intowhich the device is inserted.

In many instances, users have an interest in preventing theircompetitors from determining their particular logic gate configurations.Earlier systems addressed this concern by implementing various securitymeasures, such as encryption algorithms. Commonly-assigned U.S. Pat.Nos. 5,768,372 and 5,915,017, each of which is hereby incorporated byreference herein in its respective entirety, describe the encryption ofthe configuration data stored in the nonvolatile storage and itsdecryption upon loading into the programmable device. However, someencryption keys can be deciphered by bombarding the device with falseconfiguration data and analyzing the device's response to the falsedata. It is particularly difficult to secure against this type of attackbecause it is performed before the device enters the user-mode, wheremany security algorithms are implemented.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE

To prevent attacks similar to the one described above, the presentdisclosure relates to systems and methods for mitigating tampering of aprogrammable integrated circuit device. In particular, dirty bits andsticky error counters can be employed to determine how many unsuccessfuldevice configurations have been attempted. Multiple unsuccessfulconfiguration attempts can indicate that an attack is taking place, andas such, anti-tampering techniques can be activated to secure sensitivedata on the device when multiple unsuccessful configuration attempts aredetected.

In accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure, there isprovided a programmable integrated circuit device having a register, acontrol block, and logic circuitry. The register is configured to storea dirty bit. The control block is configured to configure theprogrammable integrated circuit device. Before beginning a givenconfiguration attempt, the control block determines the status of thedirty bit. If the dirty bit is not set, the control block will set it atthe beginning of the given configuration attempt.

In accordance with additional embodiments of the present disclosure,when the control block determines that the dirty bit is set prior tobeginning the given configuration attempt, the control block can issuean alarm that indicates, for example, that it is suspected that thedevice is being tampered with. In some embodiments, the control blockinitiates anti-tampering operations when the dirty bit is determined tobe set before beginning the configuration attempt. The anti-tamperingoperations can include, for example, clearing a key stored in theprogrammable integrated circuit device and/or killing the programmableintegrated circuit device.

In accordance with additional embodiments of the present disclosure, aprogrammable integrated circuit device includes a register that isconfigured to store a value of an error counter. After a configurationattempt fails to complete successfully, a control block will modify thevalue of the error counter. The control block then determines whetherthe value of the error counter has reached a first threshold. If it has,the control block will initiate an anti-tampering operation. In someembodiments, multiple thresholds may be configured such that differentanti-tampering operations may be initiated as the number of failedconfiguration attempts accumulate.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Further features of the disclosure, its nature and various advantageswill be apparent upon consideration of the following detaileddescription, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, inwhich like reference characters refer to like parts throughout, and inwhich:

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a logic device, according to anillustrative embodiment;

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of registers, according to an illustrativeembodiment;

FIG. 3 is a flow chart of illustrative steps performed to determinewhether a dirty bit is set at the beginning of a device's configurationstage, according to an illustrative embodiment; and

FIG. 4 is a flow chart of illustrative steps performed in associationwith a sticky error counter when a device configuration attempt fails,according to an illustrative embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

Generally, programmable devices, such as FPGAs, have two stages ofoperation; a configuration stage and a user mode stage. Theconfiguration stage may include various operations that lead up to theuser mode stage, for example, initialization, configuration, and startupoperations. The user mode stage generally refers to a stage of operationafter a device's configuration has successfully completed where thedevice is generally operating based on the logic circuitry that wasconfigured during the configuration stage.

To prevent tampering of a programmable device, various anti-tamperingtechniques may be employed during either stage of operation to disablethe device and/or erase sensitive information stored on the device oncetampering is suspected. Systems and methods are described herein foremploying an exemplary anti-tampering technique during the configurationstage of operation that utilizes a dirty bit and a sticky error counter.

The term “sticky bit” as used herein refers to a volatile or nonvolatilebit or series of bits that may be used to configure, control, and/oractivate various security measures. One type of sticky bit, a “dirtybit,” provides an indication of whether an unsuccessful attempt toconfigure a device has been previously made, which in turn, can indicatethat someone may be attempting to tamper with the device.

As an example, one type of attack a tamperer may implement is an attackthat bombards a device with programming object files (POFs) that includefalse configuration data (e.g., configuration data that would not passcyclic redundancy check (CRC) after being decrypted). By analyzing thedata that the device returns after receiving the false configurationdata, the tamperer may be able to determine the value of an encryptionkey and then, using the determined encryption key, gain access tosensitive information stored on the device. This form of attack wouldoccur while the device is in its configuration stage of operation andbefore the device enters the user mode stage where certain types ofanti-tampering operations may be employed. It should be noted that anyexample that refers to an encryption key is for illustrative purposesand may equally apply to a decryption key or any sensitive informationstored therein without departing from the scope of the disclosure.

The dirty bit and sticky error counter can be used to determine how manyunsuccessful attempts to configure the device have occurred because ofthe bombardment of POFs containing false configuration data. Once apredetermined number of unsuccessful configuration attempts have beendetected, the anti-tampering security measures configured by the stickybits may be activated while still in the configuration stage to thwartthe attack. For example, the security measures configured by the stickybits may initiate device kill sequences and/or clear the encryption keysstored in the device under certain situations. Further details regardingkill sequences and encryption key clearing are discussed in copending,commonly-assigned U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/097,816, which ishereby incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.

FIG. 1 shows an illustrative block diagram of logic device 100 which maybe subject to attacks by the tamperer described above. Device 100includes core 102 and periphery 104. Core 102 includes programmablelogic circuitry that can be configured according to configuration datathat is programmed by a user. For example, core 102 can be configured tohandle a particular type of digital signal processing algorithm or anyother suitable operation as programmed by a user. Core 102 may alsoinclude security block 106, which can handle various anti-tamperingoperations of device 100. For example, security block 106 may employanti-tampering techniques for device 100 once device 100 has entered theuser mode stage. In one embodiment, device 100 is an FPGA; however,device 100 maybe any other suitable form of a circuitry. For example,device 100 may be an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) orany suitable programmable logic device.

In some embodiments, periphery 104 includes control block 110 andregisters 112. Control block 110 generally controls the configuration ofcore 102 and may handle various other tasks associated with theconfiguration of core 102, such as, encryption, decryption, compression,decompression, and/or any other suitable function. Registers 112 mayinclude various types of volatile and nonvolatile registers for storing,for example, encryption keys and/or sticky bits which relate to securityoption information and/or security option configurations. Variousembodiments of registers 112 will be discussed in greater detail belowwith regard to FIG. 2.

In some embodiments, control block 110 receives programming object file(POF) 114. POF 114 includes configuration data from a user ormanufacturer that may be used to configure core 102 and/or varioussecurity options (e.g., anti-tampering security options), such as thosestored in registers 112 or in security block 106. In some embodiments,POF 114 can be configured such that it cannot be used to configuredevice 100 unless a specified security option is activated. As aspecific example, POF 114 may not be used to program the logic circuitryof core 102 unless device 100 includes a fused dirty bit in registers112 that activates a specific anti-tampering security option. Fuseddirty bits will be discussed in greater detail below with regard to FIG.2.

FIG. 2 shows illustrative registers 200, which may be substantiallysimilar to registers 112 of FIG. 1. Registers 200 may include firstgroup of volatile registers 202, second group of volatile registers 204,battery 206, and nonvolatile registers 208.

In some embodiments, first group of volatile registers 202, second groupof volatile registers 204, and/or nonvolatile registers 208 may be usedto store an encryption key that is used by control block 110 to decryptand/or encrypt, for example, the configuration data in POF 114 ofFIG. 1. In some embodiments, the encryption key is based on the advancedencryption standard (AES). Further details regarding various embodimentsof encryption keys and their use in encryption and decryption arediscussed in greater detail in copending, commonly-assigned U.S. patentapplication Ser. Nos. 13/097,205 and 13/098,315, which are herebyincorporated by reference herein in their respective entireties.

In some embodiments, first group of volatile registers 202, second groupof volatile registers 204, and/or nonvolatile registers 208 may be usedto store the sticky bits. As noted above, sticky bits may be used toconfigure, control, and/or activate various anti-tampering securitymeasures.

First group of volatile registers 202 and second group of volatileregisters 204 may be implemented using any suitable volatile storagetechnology. As illustrated by FIG. 2, first group of volatile registers202 may be powered by the same power supply as core 102 (not shown)and/or receives power from core 102 as illustrated by VCC and secondgroup of volatile registers 204 may be powered by battery 206 asillustrated by VCCBAT. In some embodiments, second group of volatileregisters 204 receives power via VCC in addition to power from VCCBAT(not shown). In such an embodiment, both power supplies would need to beremoved from second group of registers to clear any data stored insecond group of volatile registers 204, as opposed to just removingVCCBAT. Battery 206 may be any suitable type of battery. The sticky bitsstored in second group of volatile registers 204 may be referred toherein as battery-backed sticky bits because they receive power frombattery 206 and maintain their value when battery 206 is on even whenthe core voltage, VCC is removed (e.g., when device 100 is turned off).

Nonvolatile registers 208 may be implemented using any suitablenonvolatile storage technology. For example, nonvolatile registers 208may be implemented using erasable and programmable nonvolatiletechnology, such as an EEPROM. In such an embodiment, the data stored innonvolatile registers can be erased and/or reprogrammed by control block110. In some embodiments, nonvolatile registers 208 may be implementedusing one-time-programmable nonvolatile technology, such as fuses. Insuch an embodiment, the fuses create an open circuit when broken andcannot be refused once broken, which can render device 100 indefinitelyinoperable.

In some embodiments, different sticky bits or sticky bit patterns may beassociated with different anti-tampering security measures. For example,if a particular sticky bit or pattern of sticky bits is set, then aparticular anti-tamper option will be activated. One specific example ofan anti-tampering option is disabling an FPGA's JTAG ports. In someembodiments, the sticky bits and various security option bits are setand/or cleared by a POF, by control block 110, and/or by a manufacturer(e.g., a manufacturer may set fuses in nonvolatile registers 208 duringproduction). In some embodiments, the sticky bits may only be accessedfrom core 102. As such, one would have to enter the user mode stagebefore manipulating the values of the sticky bits, dirty bits, and/orsticky error counters. Further details regarding the configuration ofthe sticky bits as well as various anti-tamper options and operationsare discussed in copending, commonly-assigned U.S. patent applicationSer. Nos. 13/097,816 and 13/098,316, which are hereby incorporated byreference herein in their respective entireties.

In one embodiment, registers 200 is located in periphery 104 of FIG. 1;however, in some embodiments, registers 200 may be placed in core 102 inaddition to, or instead of, being placed in periphery 104. In someembodiments, the sticky bits in registers 200 may be accessed by controlblock 110 and/or core 102.

In one embodiment, the sticky bits are implemented redundantly intriplicate sticky bit groups and backed up using a shadow register thatis powered by logic in core 102. For example, identical sticky bitpatterns may be stored in each of first group of volatile registers 202,second group of volatile registers 204, nonvolatile registers 208, andin registers in core 102.

In some embodiments, the redundant sticky bit groups are configured suchthat if one sticky bit in one group is set, the corresponding sticky bitwill automatically be set in the other sticky bit groups. In thisembodiment, if power is removed from one or two of the sticky bit groupsstored in volatile registers, they will regain the appropriate settingswhen power is reapplied to the respective volatile registers based onthe settings stored in the nonvolatile registers. In some embodiments, asticky bit can be cleared by cycling both power supplies at the sametime. For example, if the sticky bit is only stored in first group ofvolatile registers 202, second group of volatile registers 204, thesticky bit will be cleared when both VCC and VCCBAT power supplies areremoved from the registers. If the tamperer powers the device downcompletely (e.g., remove both VCC and VCCBAT power supplies), the stickybit configurations may be lost, but so will the encryption keys andpossibly the configuration data that the tamperer aims to extract. Assuch, the redundant sticky bit groups prevents an attacker from removingthe anti-tampering security options that are configured using the stickybits when nonvolatile registers are used and prevents an attacker fromaccessing the encryption keys and configuration data when only volatileregisters are used.

In some embodiments, control block 110 of FIG. 1 controls the redundantconfiguration of the sticky bits between the different sticky bitgroups. For example, control block 110 may be configured to detect whenone of the sticky bit groups loses and regains power, and then, providethat sticky bit group with the appropriate sticky bit pattern when thesticky bit group regains power. In some embodiments, the redundantconfiguration is hardwired in device 100 of FIG. 1 such that the stickybits automatically synchronize.

As noted above, a dirty bit, which is a type of sticky bit, can beutilized to determine whether there has been an unsuccessful attempt toconfigure device 100 and a sticky error counter may be used to determinehow many unsuccessful attempts to configure device 100 have occurred.For example, the dirty bit is configured to be set (e.g., equal to avalue of 1) at the beginning of the configuration stage and furtherconfigured to be cleared (e.g., equal to a value of 0) by a user'sconfiguration of core 102 once device 100 enters the user mode stage orby control block 110 after an encrypted POF successfully configures thedevice (e.g., a cyclic redundancy check of the POF passes). However, ifan attempt to configure device 100 is unsuccessful or a POF containsfalse configuration data and does not pass a CRC, the dirty bit will notbe cleared. The next time a configuration attempt is made, control block110 will determine that the dirty bit is already set and takeappropriate action, which may include, for example, issuing an alarm,clearing encryption key(s), and/or initiating other anti-tamperingmeasures as discussed above with regard to FIG. 1.

As was noted above with respect to the sticky bits, a dirty bit may beconnected to the same power supply that is connected to the encryptionkey so that if a tamperer attempts to clear the dirty bit by removingits power, the tamperer might also clear the encryption key. In someembodiments, control block 110 decrements a sticky error counter when itencounters a set dirty bit at the beginning of the configuration stage.Such an embodiment is described in greater detail below with regard toFIG. 4. It is appreciated that the sticky error counter may similarly beimplemented to increment rather than decrement without departing fromthe spirit of the embodiments herein.

FIG. 3 shows illustrative process 300 for determining whether a dirtybit is set at the beginning of the configuration stage of device 100 ofFIG. 1. Process 300 generally commences when a configuration attempt isinitiated. At step 302, it is determined whether the dirty bit is set.For example, control block 110 of FIG. 1 may determine the status of thedirty bit. If it is determined at step 302 that the dirty bit is set(e.g., indicating that someone might be tampering with device 100),process 300 proceeds to either step 304 or step A depending on theconfiguration of device 100. Optionally at step 304, an alarm is issuedby device 100 that indicates that device 100 is being tampered with. Insome embodiments, the alarm may be a visual or audible alarm thatemanates from device 100 or other devices connected to device 100. Insome embodiments, device 100 may transmit an alarm to a remote stationto indicate to device 100's true owners that it is being tampered with.After, while, or instead of issuing the alarm at step 304, process 300proceeds to step 306. Which actions are taken and the timing of thoseactions may be configured by the sticky bits. At step 306,anti-tampering operations are initiated that may include, for example,disabling device 100 or clearing an encryption key stored in registers200 of FIG. 2. As noted above, further details regarding anti-tamperingoperations are discussed in, commonly-assigned U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 13/097,816, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein inits entirety. At step A, process 400 of FIG. 4 is initiated to adjust asticky error counter. Process 400 is described in greater detail belowwith regard to FIG. 4.

If the dirty bit is not set, process 300 proceeds to step 308 where thedirty bit is set. After setting the dirty bit, process 300 proceeds tostep 310. At step 310, configuration of core 102 is attempted. Asdescribed above, this may include receiving POF 114 at control block 110of FIG. 1 and using the configuration data in POF 114 to configure thelogic circuitry of core 102.

If a nefarious user is attempting to tamper with device 100, process 300will end at step 312 with an unsuccessful device configuration andrestart at step 302 when the nefarious user attempts to configure device100 again. For example, in the situation when a tamperer bombards device100 with configuration attempts, as described above, the configurationof device 100 will be attempted and fail multiple times in an effort todetermine the value of the encryption key. In such a situation, process300 will proceed to either step 304 or step A, as described above, whenthe tamperer initiates another configuration attempt because the dirtybit was not cleared at step 312.

If the configuration attempt is successful at step 310, process 300proceeds to step 314. At step 314, the dirty bit is cleared, whichindicates that the configuration successfully completed. In someembodiments, the dirty bit may be cleared by a user's logic that hasjust completed configuration or other elements in core 102. In someembodiments, the dirty bit is cleared by control block 110 when, forexample, the CRC check on the configuration data passes.

As noted above, in some embodiments, a sticky error counter may be usedto keep track of the number of times configuration attempts have failed.Each time an encrypted POF fails to load properly (e.g., either becausepower is removed, the POF fails the CRC checks, or other configurationfailure/interruption), the sticky error counter is adjusted (e.g.,decremented or incremented). For example, as discussed above, one typeof attack might include bombarding the device with false configurationinformation to attempt to determine the encryption key. Each time thefalse configuration information is received and/or fails to beprocessed, the sticky error counter is adjusted. The sticky errorcounter may be stored in any of the registers discussed above withregard to FIG. 2, for example, first group of volatile registers 202,which is powered by core 102's power supply, second group of volatileregisters 204, which is battery-backed by battery 206, or nonvolatileregisters 208, or any combination thereof.

In some embodiments, the sticky error counter may be stored redundantlyjust as the sticky bits may be, as described above. In some embodiments,the sticky error counter may be cleared in the same manner that thesticky bits are cleared, as described above (e.g., by removing powersupplied to the volatile registers). In one embodiment, the sticky errorcounter is stored in the battery-backed registers of the second group ofvolatile registers 204, where the battery that backs up registers 204also backs up a volatile encryption key such that removing the batterysupply will clear the encryption key in addition to the sticky errorcounter.

In some embodiments, once the sticky error counter reaches a value ofzero or some other predetermined threshold value, device 100 caninitiate various anti-tampering operations, such as, issuing an alarm,clearing the encryption key, killing device 100, and/or any othersuitable anti-tampering operation as described above. In someembodiments, multiple thresholds may be set so that differentanti-tampering operations may be initiated at different times. Forexample, the sticky error counter may be initially set to a value of 10,with two thresholds set at a value of 5 and a value of 0, respectively.When the sticky error counter reaches the first threshold (e.g., a valueof 5), control block 110 may initiate a first anti-tampering operation,such as, clearing the encryption key. When the sticky error counterreaches the second threshold (e.g., a value of 0), control block 110 mayinitiate a second anti-tampering operation, such as, killing device 100.In some embodiments, the sticky error counter may be incremented insteadof decremented or may be manipulated using any other suitablemathematical function.

In some embodiments, a user may modify (e.g., reset or change) the valueof the sticky error counter once the user enters the user mode stage.For example, the user may choose to reset the sticky error counter oncesuccessfully in the user mode stage. Alternatively, the user may choosenot to reset the sticky error counter to maintain a lifetime deviceconfiguration count. In some embodiments, a user may modify the valuesof the thresholds such that the alarms/anti-tampering operations areinitiated at different sticky error counter values. In some embodiments,a user may preprogram the value of the sticky error counter into one ofregisters 200 via JTAG or core-logic.

FIG. 4 shows illustrative process 400 for adjusting a sticky errorcounter when a device configuration attempt fails. As noted above withregard to FIG. 3, process 300 may enter process 400 from step A toadjust the sticky error counter when it is determined at step 302 thatthe dirty bit is set at the beginning of the configuration stage. Insome embodiments, process 400 may be entered when a failed configurationattempt is detected using any other suitable technique (e.g., atechnique that does not utilize a dirty bit). At step 402, the stickyerror counter is decremented. As noted above, the sticky error countermay be incremented instead of decremented without departing from thespirit of the embodiments herein. At step 404 it is determined whetherthe sticky error counter equals a first threshold, which may besubstantially similar to the first threshold described above.

If the sticky error counter does equal the first threshold, process 400proceeds to step 406 where a first anti-tampering operation isinitiated. For illustrative purposes, step 406 depicts clearing theencryption key; however, any suitable anti-tampering operation may beinitiated at step 406. After clearing the encryption key, process 400may exit and return to process 300 via step B to continue with anattempt to configure the device. In some embodiments, device 100 haltsand/or prevents further configuration processing and/or attempts afterthe sticky error counter reaches any of the thresholds instead of, forexample, returning to process 300 via step B.

If the sticky error counter does not equal the first threshold at step404, process 400 proceeds to step 408. At step 408, it is determinedwhether the sticky error counter equals a second threshold, which may besubstantially similar to the second threshold described above. If thesticky error counter does not equal the second threshold, process 400may exit and return to process 300 via step B to continue with anattempt to configure the device. If the sticky error counter does equalthe second threshold, process 400 proceeds to step 410 where a secondanti-tampering operation is initiated. For illustrative purposes, step410 depicts killing the device; however, any suitable anti-tamperingoperation may be initiated at step 410. It should be noted that theremay be any suitable number of thresholds where, when reached by thesticky error counter, various anti-tampering operation may be initiated.Two thresholds are depicted in process 400 for illustrative purposes andare not intended to be limiting.

In practice, one or more steps shown in process 300 or process 400 maybe combined with other steps, preformed in any suitable order, performedin parallel (e.g., simultaneously or substantially simultaneously), orremoved. For example, an alarm may issue at step 304 while process 400is decrementing the sticky error counter. Process 300 and process 400may be implemented using any suitable combination of hardware and/orsoftware in any suitable fashion.

The above described embodiments of the present disclosure are presentedfor purposes of illustration and not of limitation, and the presentdisclosure is limited only by the claims which follow.

What is claimed is:
 1. A programmable integrated circuit devicecomprising: a register for storing a dirty bit; and a control block for:determining whether the dirty bit is set before beginning aconfiguration attempt, setting the dirty bit and beginning theconfiguration attempt in response to determining that the dirty bit isnot set, and clearing the dirty bit after successfully configuringprogrammable integrated circuit device, and initiating an anti-tamperingoperation in response to determining that the dirty bit is set.
 2. Theprogrammable integrated circuit device of claim 1, wherein the controlblock is further configured to issue an alarm in response to determiningthat the dirty bit is set before beginning the configuration attempt. 3.The programmable integrated circuit device of claim 1, wherein thecontrol block is further configured to: modify an error counter value inresponse to determining that the dirty bit is set before beginning theconfiguration attempt, and wherein the anti-tampering operation occursif the error counter value equals a first threshold value and if thedirty bit is set.
 4. The programmable integrated circuit device of claim3, wherein the anti-tampering operation is a first anti-tamperingoperation, and wherein the control block is further configured toinitiate a second anti-tampering operation when the error counter valueequals a second threshold value, wherein the first threshold value isdifferent from the second threshold value.
 5. The programmableintegrated circuit device of claim 1, wherein the first anti-tamperingoperation includes at least one of clearing a key stored in theprogrammable integrated circuit device and killing the programmableintegrated circuit device.
 6. A method of mitigating tampering of aprogrammable integrated circuit device comprising: determining, using acontrol block, whether a dirty bit is set before beginning aconfiguration attempt; setting the dirty bit and beginning theconfiguration attempt in response to determining that the dirty bit isnot set; and clearing the dirty bit after successfully configuringprogrammable integrated circuit device; initiating, using a controlblock, an anti-tampering operation in response to determining that thedirty bit is set.
 7. The method of claim 6 further comprising issuing analarm in response to determining that the dirty bit is set beforebeginning the configuration attempt.
 8. The method of claim 6 furthercomprising: modifying an error counter value in response to determiningthat the dirty bit is set before beginning the configuration attempt,wherein the anti-tampering operation occurs if the error counter valueequals a first threshold value and if the dirty bit is set.
 9. Themethod of claim 8, wherein the anti-tampering operation is a firstanti-tampering operation, further comprising initiating a secondanti-tampering operation when the error counter value equals a secondthreshold value, wherein the first threshold value is different from thesecond threshold value.
 10. The method of claim 6, wherein the firstanti-tampering operation includes at least one of clearing a key storedin the programmable integrated circuit device and killing theprogrammable integrated circuit device.
 11. A programmable integratedcircuit device comprising: a register that is configured to store avalue of an error counter; and a control block that is configured to:configure the programmable integrated circuit device, modify the valueof the error counter in response to an unsuccessful configurationattempt, determine whether the value of the error counter equals a firstthreshold, and initiate a first anti-tampering operation in response tothe value of the error counter equaling the first threshold.
 12. Theprogrammable integrated circuit device of claim 11 further comprisinglogic circuitry configured to reset the value of the error counter aftera configuration attempt completes successfully.
 13. The programmableintegrated circuit device of claim 11, wherein the control block isfurther configured to determine whether the value of the error counterequals a second threshold.
 14. The programmable integrated circuitdevice of claim 13, wherein the control block is further configured toinitiate a second anti-tampering operation when the value of the errorcounter is determined to equal the second threshold, wherein the firstanti-tampering operation and the second anti-tampering operation aredifferent.
 15. The programmable integrated circuit device of claim 11,wherein modifying the value of the error counter includes at least oneof incrementing and decrementing the value of the error counter.
 16. Amethod of mitigating tampering of a programmable integrated circuitdevice comprising: receiving an initiation signal to configure theprogrammable integrated circuit device; modifying a value of an errorcounter in response to an unsuccessful attempt to configure theprogrammable integrated circuit device if the value of the error counterhas been previously set; determining whether the value of the errorcounter equals a first threshold; and initiating, using a control block,a first anti-tampering operation in response to the value of the errorcounter equaling the first threshold.
 17. The method of claim 16 furthercomprising resetting the value of the error counter after aconfiguration attempt completes successfully.
 18. The method of claim 16further comprising determining whether the value of the error counterequals a second threshold.
 19. The method of claim 18 further comprisinginitiating a second anti-tampering operation when the value of the errorcounter is determined to equal the second threshold, wherein the firstanti-tampering operation and the second anti-tampering operation aredifferent.
 20. The method of claim 16, wherein modifying the value ofthe error counter includes at least one of incrementing and decrementingthe value of the error counter.